However, since the performance of an experiment is a complex process, no repetition will be strictly identical to the original experiment and many repetitions may be dissimilar in several respects. For this reason, we need to specify what we take or require to be reproducible for instance, a particular aspect of the experimental process or a certain average over different runs.
Furthermore, there is the question of who should be able to reproduce the experiment for instance, the original experimenter, contemporary scientists, or even any scientist or human being. Investigating these questions leads to different types and ranges of experimental reproducibility, which can be observed to play different roles in experimental practice. Laboratory experiments in physics, chemistry and molecular biology often allow one to control the objects under investigation to such an extent that the relevant objects in successive experiments may be assumed to be in identical states.
Hence, statistical methods are employed primarily to further analyze or process the data see, for instance, the error-statistical approach by Deborah Mayo [ 23 ]. In contrast, in field biology, medicine, psychology and social science, such a strict experimental control is often not feasible. To compensate for this, statistical methods in these areas are used directly to construct groups of experimental subjects that are presumed to possess identical average characteristics.
It is only after such groups have been constructed that one can start the investigation of hypotheses about the research subjects. One can phrase this contrast in a different way by saying that in the former group of sciences statistical considerations mostly bear upon linking experimental data and theoretical hypotheses, while in the latter group it is often the case that statistics already play a role at the stage of producing the actual individual data.
The intervention and production aspect of scientific experimentation carries implications for several philosophical questions. A general lesson, already drawn by Bachelard, appears to be this: the intervention and production character of experimentation entails that the actual objects and phenomena themselves are, at least in part, materially realized through human interference.
Hence, it is not just the knowledge of experimental objects and phenomena but also their actual existence and occurrence that prove to be dependent on specific, productive interventions by the experimenters. This fact gives rise to a number of important philosophical issues. If experimental objects and phenomena have to be realized through active human intervention, does it still make sense to speak of a 'natural' nature or does one merely deal with artificially produced laboratory worlds?
If one does not want to endorse a fully-fledged constructivism, according to which the experimental objects and phenomena are nothing but artificial, human creations, one needs to develop a more differentiated categorization of reality. In this spirit, various authors e. These human-independent dispositions would then underlie and enable the human construction of particular experimental processes. A further important question is whether scientists, on the basis of artificial experimental intervention, can acquire knowledge of a human-independent nature.
Some philosophers claim that, at least in a number of philosophically significant cases, such 'back inferences' from the artificial laboratory experiments to their natural counterparts can be justified. Another approach accepts the constructed nature of much experimental science, but stresses the fact that its results acquire a certain endurance and autonomy with respect to both the context in which they have been realized in the first place and later developments.
In this vein, Davis Baird [ 24 ] offers an account of 'objective thing knowledge', the knowledge encapsulated in material things, such as Watson and Crick's material double helix model or the Indicator of Watt and Southern's steam engine. Another relevant feature of experimental science is the distinction between the working of an apparatus and its theoretical accounts.
In actual practice it is often the case that experimental devices work well, even if scientists disagree on how they work. This fact supports the claim that variety and variability at the theoretical level may well go together with a considerable stability at the level of the material realization of experiments. This claim can then be exploited for philosophical purposes, for example to vindicate entity realism [ 14 ] or referential realism [ 8 ]. Traditionally, philosophers of science have defined the aim of science as, roughly, the generation of reliable knowledge of the world.
Moreover, as a consequence of explicit or implicit empiricist influences, there has been a strong tendency to take the production of experimental knowledge for granted and to focus on theoretical knowledge. However, if one takes a more empirical look at the sciences, both at their historical development and at their current condition, this approach must be qualified as one-sided. After all, from Archimedes' lever-and-pulley systems to the cloned sheep Dolly, the development of experimental science has been intricately interwoven with the development of technology [ 25 , 26 ].
Experiments make essential use of often specifically designed technological devices, and, conversely, experimental research often contributes to technological innovations. Moreover, there are substantial conceptual similarities between the realization of experimental and that of technological processes, most significantly the implied possibility and necessity of the manipulation and control of nature.
Taken together, these facts justify the claim that the science-technology relationship ought to be a central topic for the study of scientific experimentation.
One obvious way to study the role of technology in science is to focus on the instruments and equipment employed in experimental practice. Many studies have shown that the investigation of scientific instruments is a rich source of insights for a philosophy of scientific experimentation see, e. One may, for example, focus on the role of visual images in experimental design and explore the wider problem of the relationship between thought and vision.
Or one may investigate the problem of how the cognitive function of an intended experiment can be materially realized, and what this implies for the relationship between technological functions and material structures. Or one may study the modes of representation of instrumentally mediated experimental outcomes and discuss the question of the epistemic or social appraisal of qualitative versus quantitative results.
In addition to such studies, several authors have proposed classifications of scientific instruments or apparatus. One suggested distinction is that between instruments that represent a property by measuring its value e. Such classifications form an excellent starting point for investigating further philosophical questions on the nature and function of scientific instrumentation. They demonstrate, for example, the inadequacy of the empiricist view of instruments as mere enhancers of human sensory capacities.
Yet, an exclusive focus on the instruments as such may tend to ignore two things. First, an experimental setup often includes various 'devices', such as a concrete wall to shield off dangerous radiation, a support to hold a thermometer, a spoon to stir a liquid, curtains to darken a room, and so on. Such devices are usually not called instruments, but they are equally crucial to a successful performance and interpretation of the experiment and hence should be taken into account.
Second, a strong emphasis on instruments may lead to a neglect of the environment of the experimental system, especially of the requirement to control the interactions between the experimental system and its environment. Thus, a comprehensive view of scientific experimentation needs to go beyond an analysis of the instrument as such by taking full account of the specific setting in which this instrument needs to function. Finally, there is the issue of the general philosophical significance of the experiment-technology relationship. Some of the philosophers who emphasize the importance of technology for science endorse a 'science-as-technology' account.
That is to say, they advocate an overall interpretation in which the nature of science--not just experimental but also theoretical science--is seen as basically or primarily technological see for instance, [ 5 , 7 ] and [ 11 ]. Other authors, however, take a less radical view by criticizing the implied reduction of science to technology and by arguing for the sui generis character of theoretical-conceptual and formal-mathematical work.
Thus, while stressing the significance of the technological--or perhaps, more precisely, the intervention and production dimension of science--these views nevertheless see this dimension as complementary to a theoretical dimension see, e. This brings us to a further central theme in the study of scientific experimentation, namely the relationship between experiment and theory.
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The theme can be approached in two ways. One approach addresses the question of how theories or theoretical knowledge may arise from experimental practices. Thus, Franklin [ 21 ] has provided detailed descriptions and analyses of experimental confirmations and refutations of theories in twentieth century physics. Giora Hon [ 28 ] has put forward a classification of experimental error, and has argued that the notion of error may be exploited to elucidate the transition from the material, experimental processes to propositional, theoretical knowledge see also [ 29 ].
A second approach to the experiment-theory relationship examines the question of the role of existing theories, or theoretical knowledge, within experimental practices. Over the last 25 years, this question has been debated in detail. Are experiments, factually or logically, dependent on prior theories, and if so, in which respects and to what extent? The remainder of this section reviews some of the debates on this question. The strongest version of the claim that experimentation is theory dependent says that all experiments are planned, designed, performed, and used from the perspective of one or more theories about the objects under investigation.
In this spirit, Justus von Liebig and Karl Popper, among others, advocated the view that all experiments are explicit tests of existing theories. This view completely subordinates experimental research to theoretical inquiry. However, on the basis of many studies of experimentation published during the last 25 years, it can be safely concluded that this claim is false. For one thing, quite frequently the aim of experiments is just to realize a stable phenomenon or a working device.
Yet, the fact that experimentation involves much more than theory testing does not, of course, mean that testing a theory may not be an important goal in particular scientific settings. At the other extreme, there is the claim that, basically, experimentation is theory-free. The older German school of 'methodical constructivism' see [ 6 ] came close to this position.
The philosophy of scientific experimentation: a review
A somewhat more moderate view is that, in important cases, theory-free experiments are possible and do occur in scientific practice. This view admits that performing such 'exploratory' experiments does require some ideas about nature and apparatus, but not a well-developed theory about the phenomena under scrutiny. Ian Hacking [ 14 ] and Friedrich Steinle [ 22 ] make this claim primarily on the basis of case studies from the history of experimental science.
Michael Heidelberger [ 30 ] aims at a more systematic underpinning of this view. Used - Very Good. Leather Bound. Full leather, gilt dec. Bright, clean copy. Subject: Medical History. Classic of the scientific method and philosophy of science, first published in Hardcover, full brown cloth, gilt titling. Light wear to book; jacket lightly smudged, spine tanned, minor edgewear. Text clean; xix, , pages.. Hard Cover. Classics of Medicine Library, As New. Disclaimer:An apparently unread copy in perfect condition.
Dust cover is intact; pages are clean and are not marred by notes or folds of any kind. A clean copy in excellent condition, appears unread. Three-banded full gray leather, with gilt-stamped lettering and decorations. Silk ribbon marker sewn-in. No marks. Tight binding. A very attractive copy, gift quality.
Secure packaging for safe delivery. Dust jacket quality is not guaranteed. Translated by H. Greene; Introduction by L. New York: Henry Schuman, First published in , it "struck cultivated minds with admiration and astonishment. Reprt of 1st Eng ed, Seller: Dr. Hoff's Therapeutic Bibliotheca Published: Near Fine. Translated from the French by Henry Copley Greene. A specially bound facsimile reprint of the Macmillan edition. Octavo, bound in purple leather with gilt lettering and design, raised bands along spine, all edges gilt, marbled endpapers, ribbon book mark.
Previous owner's book-plate on front paste-down, else near fine. An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. Hardcover in dark grey or purple leather with designs in gilt on both boards and spine. Raised spine bands. Binding has no wear. All edges of text block are gilt. Faux marbled endpapers. Silk ribbon bookmark. Text is clean. Contains the limited edition bookplate laid in loosely; copy number A staple-bound copy of the editor's notes is included with the set. The booklet has some toning.
Facsimile reprint of the edition. Bookplate indicating Copy with typed name of physician. Full, gilt tooled dark blue Leather, with gilt page edges; gilt spine decorations and lettering; faux marbled endpapers; silk ribbon place marker; raised bands to the spine.
Slight wear to outer edges of gilt pages.. Seller: Sheila B. This is not reasonable given that the work done in vitro is continuous with the work done in the stomach.
In evolutionary biology, the name of Henry Kettlewell is well known. In Britain, the typical moth had been prevalent in most areas prior to industrialization. However, the proportion of the typical variety in relation to the other two types changed during the twentieth century. Kettlewell showed that this change was due to the change in colour of the landscape. Kettlewell first showed that the different kinds of moths were more or less conspicuous depending on the colour of the background on which they were settled.
He did this by using volunteers to rank the degree of conspicuousness of each type of moth on different colour backgrounds. In the next stage, he put all three types of moths in a cage with different colour bark on which they could settle. He then introduced birds predator to moths into the cage. He found that the rate at which the moths were eaten depended on the colour of the bark on which they were settled.
As three different kinds of moths were used along with different colour barks, the data analysis was very complex in this part of the study. The third part of his study was done in native conditions. Kettlewell released all three kinds of moths in both polluted dark background and unpolluted lighter background areas and tracked how many survived.
This last part of the investigation depended on previously marked moths that had survived being recaptured in traps. Kettlewell showed that the dark species of moths survived better in a polluted dark environment than the lighter colour varieties whereas the lighter typical species survived better in the less polluted light environment compared with the darker varieties.
He showed this was due to the colour of the landscape. The observation part of the account can be done in a straightforward manner. Hacking has told us that the observation part is a source of detection—in this case the numerical values related to what kind of moth species is conspicuous on which colour bark, the numerical values related to different species surviving predation in the cage, the kind of bait used for re-capture in native conditions.
However, what, according to Hacking, is the experiment part? In the field of study of animal behavior and psychology, the work of Harry Harlow is well known amongst those working on attachment theory. Harlow conducted a series of experiments to measure degrees of attachment of an infant monkey to the quality of a carer. Eight new-born monkeys were separated from their mothers immediately after birth.
Milk was dispensed from each surrogate. Harlow measured the time that each infant monkey spent with each surrogate over a period of some months. He found that the infant monkeys spent more time with the cloth-covered surrogate than with the wire one. He then withdrew milk dispensation from the cloth surrogate. He found that the total time that the infants spent with the cloth surrogate was still much greater than that time spent with the wire surrogate—the infants would only go to the wire surrogate to feed when hungry—as soon as their hunger abated, they returned to the cloth covered surrogate.
Harlow concluded from these particular experiments that infant monkeys had requirements social, cognitive, emotional beyond those of just nutrition milk in their early years.
2. Historical Background: Philosophical and Scientific
In the field of geology, the work of Nevil Maskelyne and colleagues gave an initial indication of the density of the earth Danson Isaac Newton himself, in the Principia had indicated that this should be possible but had discarded the idea as he believed the instrumentation of the day would not be able to detect the small changes in the shift of the pendulum. Maskelyne met with greater success at a mountain in central Scotland, Schiehallion chosen for its symmetry. The investigation was divided into two stages. The first entailed measurement of the deflection of the pendulum with respect to positions of fixed stars for which two observatories were built—one on the north side and one on the south.
The measurements taken were in the astronomical measure of arc minutes. The other stage of the investigation involved the survey of the mountain in order to measure its volume. Much of this work was subsequently the starting point for Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin in their work on geology Rudwick a. His work consisted of analysis of rock strata and analysis chemical, thermogenic of different kinds of rock formations granite and gneiss, sediment[ary] and volcanic [igneous] as well as the identification and recording of the frequency of the occurrence of fossils in these different rock strata.
I now want to turn to physics—the principal focus of study for Hacking. In the early part of the twentieth century, Robert Millikan conducted a series of investigations to establish that the charge of the electron was quantized had a discrete fundamental value and occurred in situ as multiples of this value rather than a continuum as had been previously proposed by Thomas Edison, amongst others Holton Any charged particle in the container containing this supersaturated mixture causes ionization as it moves.
Measurement of the velocities of the fall of the cloud under just gravity and then with a known voltage should determine the charge on the electron. Thompson had attempted to measure the charge on the electron in this way but had tried to measure the charge of the whole cloud and had met with little success—owing in the main to practical obstacles Goodstein , Millikan, in attempting the same as Thompson, found that applying a much greater electric field across the charged plates resulted not in the cloud being suspended, as had been predicted, but most of the cloud dispersing, leaving only a few drops suspended between the plates.
Millikan deduced that working with individual droplets would overcome many of the logistical and numerical obstacles that Thompson had faced in working with a whole cloud ibid. The first issue they had to overcome was that of evaporation. They did this by replacing water drops with substances whose evaporation rate would have a negligible effect on their measurements. The first substance they used was oil with a low vapour pressure that would easily form a spray they produced the oil drops as a spray with a perfume atomizer using watch oil bought at minimal cost at a local market.
Evaporation issues were only the first of many obstacles they had to overcome to arrive at a working system, including inter alia : temperature within the chamber affecting viscosity of the air, allowing for the evaporation of the oil as well as glycerine and mercury —however minimal, the motion of the air inside the chamber, the fluctuation of the charge applied by the battery source Franklin Within a sealed container Millikan et al.
Above the top plate was an aperture through which the atomizer could spray droplets into the container. The top charged plate had a small aperture through which oil glycerine, mercury droplets could drop under gravity. In the space between the two plates were three apertures: one for the short focal telescope to view the drops, one for a light source in order to be able to see the drops and the other for an X-ray source to induce ionization of the air.
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Differences in the time measured for an oil drop to move across the given distance Looking at these examples of scientific work, should we refer to them as experiments or a series of experiments? Gooding proposes a potentially helpful way of thinking about this question. Gooding asks us not to talk about experiment but experimentation and think of it as a process 37 , 65— However, does viewing experimentation as a process help us in delineating experiment from observation as categories distinct from each other as Hacking does in his account?
We have seen that observation, for Hacking, is a means of detection. However, this too, more often than not, tends to be a process. One example cited earlier Hacking uses as an example of an observation is of the detection of solar neutrinos , The detection of solar neutrinos runs thus. Solar neutrinos are produced as a by-product of nuclear fusion in the core of the sun Pinch , 5.
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The fact that they are highly unreactive of course makes them very difficult to detect. In the s, Raymond Davis Jr. The chlorine in perchloroethylene contains traces of a radioactive chlorine isotope 37 with which the solar neutrinos are able to react. The reaction between the chlorine isotope and solar neutrinos gives rise to the production of a radioactive argon isotope Other isotopes of argon 36 or 38 are added which aids the argon isotope 37 to bind to the helium gas, which is flushed through the container to remove the argon isotope The helium containing the argon isotope 37 is then passed through pre-cooled charcoal, which collects the argon isotope It is the decay of the argon isotope 37 , which can be detected via a pre-calibrated Geiger counter.
It is apparent that this process of detection of solar neutrinos is exactly that—a process—with a multitude of different manipulations, practices and interpretations. Both observation and experiment in practice involve undertaking various activities, manipulations, interventions and interpretations.
Hasok Chang has proposed that the pursuit of a systematic analysis of activities entailed in scientific practice is a worthy goal Chang As we saw earlier, both encompass generation of data so this could not act as an adequate marker. Lorraine Daston, in her account of practices of observation in the period —, gives a glimpse of the various views circulating around the projected distinction between observation and experiment during this period Daston , 85— Amongst these views, many gave importance to intervention or its synonyms as an important marker for distinguishing between observation and experiment.
However, even then that is, before the use of increasingly complex instrumentation became ubiquitous in scientific experimentation and practice in the modern age some could see ambiguities arising. The case of observation of solar neutrinos also makes very clear, with its numerous and complex manipulations, that intervention is not a reasonable candidate for acting as a category distinguisher between observation and experiment. Like Gooding and Chang, most believe that scientific experimentation should be viewed as a continuous process rather than one entailing discrete parts—and the terminology used underlines this sense of continuousness.
Burian shows that Brachet was not guided by theoretical considerations about how the nucleic acids may be distributed across the lifetime of cells in various organisms. Burian therefore also uses the term in the same sense as Steinle insofar as to distinguish a particular kind of experimentation from theory. All these terms exploratory experimentation, experimental system, manipulable system, production system and their respective accounts emerge with the aim of distinguishing them from theory-dominated accounts such as hypothesis testing.
None of these accounts seek to do what Hacking does with his stipulation of experiment: distinguish between different kinds of activities and interventions within the process of scientific experimentation. However, elsewhere, James Woodward, together with James Bogen, has sought to put forward an account which seeks to specifically delineate the process of scientific experimentation. It completely abandons the vocabulary of observation and experiment and uses data and phenomena instead. Bogen and Woodward tell us that data should be thought of as that which provides evidence for the existence of phenomena Bogen and Woodward , Data can usually be detected.
However, data usually cannot be predicted. Phenomena, on the other hand, can only be detected through the use of data Bogen and Woodward , Examples of data include bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in psychological experiments. These instances of data provide evidence for the following phenomena respectively: weak neutral currents, decay of the proton and chunking effects in human short-term memory.
Bogen and Woodward analyse a number of examples to illustrate the distinction between data and phenomena Bogen and Woodward , — Examples they use to show what they mean include the melting point of lead from chemistry and weak neutral currents from physics. However, this is not what actually happens. It is not possible to determine the melting point of lead by taking a single thermometer reading. Even if systematic errors are reduced, there will be variations in the thermometer readings such as to give a scatter of results that all differ from each other, even if potential sources of error are minimized.
It is the latter, phenomena, which becomes the object of systematic scientific explanation. This would be expressed in terms such as metallic bonding mechanisms and type of co-ordination. The data too can become the object of scientific explanation. However, the terms in which explanations regarding data would be made would be different from those made for phenomena. Explanations related to data would include discussion of the accuracy of the thermometer, the purity of the lead sample used, the point at which the thermometer is taken when the sample of lead starts to melt, at mid-way, when the sample has all melted , the reliability of the heating mechanism and such like.
These terms and considerations are very different to those related to discussions in terms of molecular structure. Bogen and Woodward use the following example to show what they mean. The evidence for the existence of the phenomenon of weak neutral currents came from two different kinds of investigations.
The data from CERN comprised of bubble chamber photographs where the detection method depended on the formation of bubbles while that from NAL consisted of patterns of discharge in particle detectors where the detection method registered the passage of charged tracks by electronic means. These two very different kinds of data—from very different kinds of apparatus—provided the evidence for the same phenomenon: the weak neutral current. The terms of explanation for the phenomenon, the weak neutral current, comprise the interaction of the Z particle with the weak force—this is common in both cases: from the data from CERN as well as the very different data from the NAL.
However, the terms of explanation of the two different data sets have very little in common: the data set from CERN comprises of terms consisting of, inter alia, the nature of the neutron beam, the shielding chamber, the size of the chamber as well as the type of liquid used in the chamber. To Bogen and Woodward, the key feature of phenomena is that they be the objects of general scientific explanation, rather than the particular explanations, which are the characteristic feature of data, and from which they are distinct , Data are highly localized and idiosyncratic and demand explanations that are framed in very different terms to that of phenomena for which they act as evidence Bogen and Woodward , Mapping the data phenomena account onto the cases cited earlier would thus yield the following outcomes.
For Beaumont, the data relates to the results of digestion from both the in vivo and in vitro parts of his investigation and the explanatory terms in which they are framed relate to degrees of acidity, temperature readings and measurements of time, while the terms in which the explanatory terms for the phenomena are framed include peristaltic movement, the anatomy and composition of gastric cell types and the physical topography of the stomach with respect to the rest of the gastrointestinal tract.
For Kettlewell, knowledge about data would relate to what kind of moth is conspicuous on which colour bark, the numbers of different kinds of moths surviving exposure to predation in the cage, what kind of bait is used to trap surviving moths in native conditions. The phenomenon is accounted for by discussion in terms of the changing colour of the landscape owing to pollution and degrees of conspicuousness to predators. For Hutton, the data was framed in terms of chemical, temperature and field measurements and anatomical differentiation in fossil records while the phenomena was framed in terms of soil erosion and the influence of the physical elements wind, water on this erosion as indicative of changing climate and its correlation with fossil deposits.
For Millikan, the data would be framed in terms of time taken for an oil drop to travel a distance of Although both Hacking and Bogen and Woodward aim, in each of their accounts of delineating scientific experimentation, to use a criteria based approach, the criteria they use are very different. It is worth noting some points of conceptual overlap, as well as departure, between the two accounts—notwithstanding the different lexicon of each. At first glance, both use phenomena in a similar way.
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This stipulative approach, as we have seen, has limited value when used in practice across a whole range of fields of enquiry. We have seen from our discussion that the observation versus experiment account has significant weaknesses as a means of delineating scientific experimentation within scientific practice—across a range of cases from various fields of scientific enquiry.
This would suggest that the experiment versus observation framework—where observation and experiment are cast as polarities, rather than as complements of each other—as Hooke and Boyle did—is not a sound basis on which to make value judgments. This, of course, belies the considerable academic scholarship by historians of science that exists on the nature and characteristics of scientific practice, in particular, scientific experimentation, in pre-modern cultures that has shown the significant limitations of this position; Greek, Latin, Arabic and Chinese to name just a few.
See Lloyd , on Greek and Chinese science and references therein. For Arabic science, see Sabra For Latin, see Lindberg For an example from the exact sciences, see the case of geometrical optics: for Greek, see Smith , and for Arabic, see Sabra For the case of medicine, see Pormann and Savage-Smith See Hacking , In particular, see footnote 12 in Pomata See Park , 15—44 , Pomata , 45—80 and Daston , 81— See also Schickore for the case of the microscope.
Also see Daston and Galison Those who have been interested in the detailed historical accounts of particular experiments include Galison , , Pickering , Gooding , Worral , Wheaton , Stuewer and Franklin Others have been concerned with the role of experiment in knowledge acquisition such as Gooding , Kuhn , Dear and Tiles Some have been interested in the philosophy of scientific experimentation Radder a , b which takes into account the nexus that experimentation provides for the meeting of theory, technology and modelling amongst others.
Philsophers of science interested in observation include Shapere and Fodor See Radder b , 15 and Gooding , Hacking's primary aim in Representing and Intervening Hacking , however, lies in the juxtaposition of experiment to theory rather than an analysis of experiment relative to observation per se. Although Hacking takes up the subject of experiment again in some of his later work, there he is more concerned with other matters. He deals with the anti-realist position see Hacking , for a response, see Shapere or with trying to defend the stability of laboratory practice see Hacking Also see Pinch Brigitte Falkenburg has proposed that this position has limited value as theories of entities such as neutrinos, their detectors and the way information is transmitted from the source are all inextricably linked see Falkenburg For a detailed explanation see Galison The Compton effect refers to the scattering of X-rays by electrons in work done by Arthur Compton in the s.
The Zeeman effect refers to the splitting of the energy levels of an atom when it is placed in a magnetic field. Pieter Zeeman and Hendrik Lorentz did this work in the s. The photoelectric effect refers to the detection of a current when light is shone on some metals and is taken as an indication of the emission of electrons. Many substances act as superconductors at temperatures near to absolute zero. Beauchamp should read Dr. Beaumont see Bernard , 8. The work was conducted during the s, not a decade earlier as stated see Bernard , 8. Such as neurological processes which control the mechanical and nerve impulse activities of the stomach.
For a synopsis of Henry Kettlewell's study on moths, see Franklin Kettlewell's work was published in Heredity , , David Rudge has worked extensively on the history of Kettlewell's work, see Rudge a , b , , , He has also dealt extensively with the issue of statistical error in Kettlewell's numerical analysis Rudge , a , b and the issue of validity of control experiments in which he deals in particular with Joel Hagen's critique of Kettlewell's use of controls Hagen ; for an overview of the issue of the use of controls on Kettlewell's experiments, see Brandon The validity of the controls Kettlewell used relate to the geographical areas in which he performed the experiments Birmingham, UK and Dorset, UK.
See Chapters 11— See also Smallwood Also see Repcheck For reception of Hutton's work amongst his contemporaries, see Dean For a synopsis of Hutton's biography see his entry in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography. See also Rudwick , , b. See also Franklin , Barnes et al. Also see Niaz for an appraisal of the studies of Holton, Franklin, Barnes et al. Also see Franklin , — Millikan's conclusions were contested amongst specialists in the field for more than a decade after publication of this work; see Holton in particular; for a defence of Millikan, see Goodstein In defence of Hacking, his principal aim in Representing and Intervening in making his observation experiment distinction is in service of other philosophical ends such as entity realism.
Further, within its own time, Hacking's drawing of a polarity between observation and experiment served the purpose of challenging the hitherto identification of experiment with observation as a perceptual rather than a detection form. One may therefore reasonably posit that the criteria Hacking puts forward as his description of experiment should not be applied rigidly.
I think therefore it is not unreasonable to take Hacking at his own repeated word. This case has been analyzed in detail by Shapere and Pinch as well as dealt with in summary by Bogen and Woodward , Others too have noted the ambiguities arising out of the very particular way Hacking stipulates his category of experiment, See Feest , 63— Rose-Mary Sargent too uses the term but for descriptive rather than analytical purposes Steinle , S See also Woodward for a review of the topic where he deals with the different positions on the subject matter, including his own.
Since then it has been re-stated by Woodward on a number of occasions Woodward , , In these revised versions, however, Woodward has been more concerned with dealing with the relationship between this account and its relationship with scientific theory. The data phenomena account has been contested on various grounds. These contestations have tended to focus on two areas. First, whether it is reasonable to draw a distinction between data and phenomena at all whereas both should be viewed as patterns within data sets Glymour Further, even if one were to draw a distinction between them, how one does this—in particular, the role of assumptions in this process McAllister Woodward , — amongst others Apel , 27—31 , have responded to these points in recent years.
The other area of focus has been the relationship of data and phenomena within Bogen and Woodward's account to theory Schindler , ; in particular, as it relates to the influence of theory on observation and its implications for reliability. However, where used to delineate scientific practice qua practice, it appears reasonably robust—as even its detractors concede Schindler , For details of how the melting point of lead is determined under laboratory conditions, see Bogen and Woodward , —